# VIETNAM

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ANTI-WAR UNITED FRONT SHAPING UP IN SOUTH VIET NAM CITIES

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# Nixon's "Vietnamization" POLICY IS DOOMED TO FAILURE

N his program-speech of Nov. 3, 1669, President Nixon defined his Viet Nam policy as follows: "We can persist in our search for a just peace through a negotiated settlement if possible, or through continued implementation of our plan for Vietnamization." He stressed that that plan "will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the of what happens on negotiating front."

Thus, the keystone of his olicy is "Vietnamization" policy is "Vietnamization of what he calls the "search for peace.

COROLLARY OF NI-XON'S DOCTRINE

ACCORDING to Mr. Ni-xon, the "Vietnamiza-COORDING to Mr Ni-xon, the "Victuaniza-tion" policy stems from his "new" global strategy, from that famous "Nixonian doctrine" regarding Asia, which can be put in a nrtshell as follows:

i—"The United States will keep all its treaty commitments." In other words it means to pursue its search for world hegemony, maintain its positions everywhere, and prop up US-paid neo-colonialist regimes.

2-"We (the US) shall provide a shield if a nuclear ower threatens the freedom

of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our We security". This is the usual for nuclear blackmail aimed at gos bullying the national libera-ole, tion movements, alleged to be loyal to a foreign " nuclear

cases involving

\_ " In

3—"In cases involving other types of aggression, we (the US) shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defence." This is the of the US not to give up of the US not to give up confirmation of the resolve of the US not to give up its role as international gendarme ready to crush all uprising attempts labelled "aggressian". For the sake is the nationality of the men who are to use the weapons: formerly, these were the American forces, "special" and other to Nam". The Nixon administration which is aware of the limits of US power, would rather of US power, would rather set natives against natives and Asians against Asians.

Applied to Viet Nam, the "Nixonian doctrine" is named "Vietnamization." This means first that Nixon's

Viet Nam policy does not relinquish any of its objectives. The US intends to continue its neo-colonial domination in South Viet Nam, shore up the pupper tignine, perpetuate the partition of Viet Nam. To attain these goals, the task now is incumbent on the quislings who, on orders quislings who, on orders with the material means supplied by them, will take over the US war burden.

SUBSTANCE, STAGES AND PURPOSE OF "VIET-NAMIZATION "

DEFINING the word "Vietnamization". Secretary of Defense
Melvil Laird said on Sept.
26, 1969: "Vietnamization
means a let more than
modernization of the South
Vietnamese armed forces to
permit their continuing asresponsibility. Vietnamization means the progressive
transfer to the South Vietnamese of responsibility for namese of responsibility for all aspects of the war and management of their affairs: stronger government, strong-er economy, stronger mili-tary forces, stronger police for internal security."

(Continued page 2)

South Viet Nam

In this issue:

In the First Week of 1970

### **PLAF Attacks Stepped Up in** Da Nana — Chu Lai Area. Mekong Delta and Western High Plateaux

- In 3 Days. Over 100 Bases and Positions between Da Nang and Quang Ngai Stormed, 900 Enemy Troops Put out of Action.
- O Cam Zoi Base Overrun, 400 US "Marine" Casualties, Important Enemy Material Losses (6 Jan.).
- O In My The Province, a Puppet Company and 300 Soldiers Knocked Action; 150 Others Routed out of in Chau Doc Province.

Processing of azolla pinnata, a green compost, at Hai Anh co-operative, Hai Hau district, Nam Ha province.



Thus Vietnamization implies not only a reinforce-ment of the puppet army into one capable of replacing the US troops, but also and solidation of the neo-colonial regime into one capable of subduing the people and drawing from them the resources necessary to keep going the war machine. In fact, since the beginning of last year, the US has set to the equipping and intensive training of the puppet army. Meanwhile has been striving strengthen the Thieu-Ky Khiem regime with the backing of the military group, stepping up the "accelerated pacification" campaign to clear the areas still under its control, rounding up youths and pressganging them into the pressganging them into the army and levying new taxes

Such a program cannot be completed in a short period of time, especially the relief of US troops by the puppet army, without running the risk of altering the relations of forces. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relation Committee, M. Laird thinks that a "US transitional force" about 250,000 men will remain in South Viet Nam to support the puppet army till 1971 and will be replaced the following year by a US
"residual force" of several thousand American "advi sers". These stages being envisaged in the most propitious conditions, there is every prospect of a prolongation of the presence of US

The purpose of that relief "plan is multiple. In the immediate future, the American rulers want to limit US direct commitment Viet Nam to keep down American casualties and war expenditures at a level ac ceptable to the American public. The human and material losses of the US in Viet Nam are at the bottom

inflation, soaring cost of living, social troubles—and the weakening of its posi-tions in the world. The anti-war movement US has taken such propor tions as never seen in the placate popular discontent, the Nixon administration has begun the withdrawal "by dribblets" of US troops and announced a "Vietnamizaannounced a "Vietnamiza-tion" plan. At the same time the plan aims at some time the plan aims at secur ing at the conference table a "position of strength" from which the US claims to dictate its conditions, other-The talks in Paris only the US to prosecute the war till victory. It is still nur turing the long-term illusion

"Vietnamization" thus means prolongation of the war, pitting Vietnamese against Vietnamese, continu-

of a military decision.

ation of the carnage in Nam and sabotage of the Paris Conference.

INSOLUBLE CONTRA-DICTIONS

"Vietnamization plan of the US is torn by insoluble contradic-

tween the end and the means. In order to maintain by force of arms its neo-colonialist domination while a half-a-million-strong expedi-tionary force has proved impotent, the US reckons to trust that role to a puppet mercenary army in disintegration. The reinforce-ment of such an army implies plies the existence of puppet administration while the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique can hardly stand on its own legs even with fascist repressive measures against repressive mea Then, contradiction be

contradiction be

tween the pressing need of inevitable slowness of Vietnamization plan The Nixon administration wishes to rapidly ease the pressure of popular protest drawal of troops in small doses does not work as US doses does not work as US
public opinion insists on the
immediate repatriation of
American servicemen. Satisfaction of such a demand
would jeopardize US military
position in the formation and
equipping of new puppet
units. But the weakness of the Saigon regime and the exiguity of the areas under its control do not allow a speedy performance. The announcement of withdraw als — even gradual and par-tial—of US troops is a hard blow dealt to the morale of the US and puppet soldiers and aggravates the divergencies in the enemy ranks, which makes "Vietnamization" more difficult.

### THIN HOPES

HE Nixon administration boisterously advertizes the merits and success of its plan. US propaganda extols the raising combativeness of the puppet army and the strengthening of the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique while trying to expose the weak-ness of the Liberation Arm-ed Forces of the PRG. The obduracy of the Nixon ad ministration to pursue war of aggression is only matched by its craftiness to hoodwink public opinion.

However, all these hope are vanishing into thin air. Does Mr. Nixon wish in that way to reduce US combat casualties, limit US direct involvement and appease public opinion in the US? The battle-count in 1969— "Vietnamization" yearcan hardly confirm that hope, for that year, US toll in manpower and materials outstripped that of 1968, the

year held by Mr. Nixon as the most disastrous for the US forces in Viet Nam. Nothing shows that the trend can be reversed in the year which has just started. The time will come when the will be seen through unless it is stepped up to the great detriment of US position in South Viet Nam.

Does Mr. Nixon want to gain at all costs a "position of strength" at the Paris negotiations? The failure of US escalation in North Viet Nam and the staggering blows dealt by the Tet 1968 offensive clearly forced the offensive clearly forced the US to the four-party conference on Viet Nam in Paris. While the deployment of huge forces and of all atrocious war means has not helped the US get a position of strength, how can it do so by substituting pupper troops for American Gls? troops for American Cis?
The major trumpeard of
this illusory "position of
strength" is precisely the
US Expeditionary Corps;
without it, what "position
of strength" can Mr. Nixon hone to attain?

The US President wants to snatch a military de-cision in the long run. But the outcome of the war cannot be decided by some change of circumstances. It depends on essential and permanent factors: the mo-rale and combativeness of the troops, strategy and tactics, the stability of the rear base... As time goes by, the criminal character of the war of aggression becomes more transparent, which radically undermines which radically undermines the fighting potential of the US troops, whose partial withdrawal embitters the differences in the ranks of the US and quisilings. General Abrams' defensive strategy clashes with the character of the US war of aggression which should essentially be an offensive one. Far from backing the US troops in South Viet Nam, public opinion in the US has been pressing for their immediate repatriation. On the other hand, the righteousness of the Vietnamese cause mobilizes broader and broader sections of the Southern people for the struggle for independ-ence and freedom and wins struncher and stauncher international support. The Lib-eration armed forces are more and more combat-harden-ed through a long resistance ed through a long resistance war and capable of striking at their enemy even in his last refuge. With the forma-tion of the PRG, the free areas in the South have been consolidated; North Viet Nam, the great rear-base of the South, leaning on the socialist countries, is keeping up successfully its socialist construction in to give more effective assistance to the libera-

tion in the South. Nothing

confirms Nixon's hope to see

tilting in favour of the

prolongation of the war.

balance of

IKE Mr. Johnson's ill-

fated "de - American-ization" of the war, Mr. Nixon's "Vietnamization"

is doomed to failure. The only possible "de-Americanization" is the total

and unconditional with-drawal of all US troops from South Viet Nam. The only sensible "Vietnam-

only sensible "Vietnam

namese people settle them

THE ONLY WAY OUT selves their own affairs without outside interference, first self-determination of South Viet Nam and then

A pointer has been sup-plied by the ten-point overall solution of the NFL and PRG. Short of that, find the light at the end to stubbornly progressing.

HUONG NAM

50th Plenary Session of Paris Conference on Viet Nam (Jan. 15, 1970)

## DRVN Envoy Calls for a US Realistic Approach to Viet Nam

A T the 50th session of the Paris Conference, Ambassador Ha Van Lau, speaking on behalf of the DRVN Government delegation, laid bare the Nixon administration's systematic and crafty manoes vres in the past year, aimed at fooling public opinion, covering up its scheme to covering up its scheme to prolong the war and im-posing neo-colonialism on South Viet Nam, thus blocking the progre the Paris Conference.

President Nixon has been president Nixon has been unceasingly protesting his "desire to end the Viet Nam war", he pointed out. But during the past year in office, he did not do anything to stop it but instead dragged it on and even intensified it.

Mr. Ha Van Lau then denounced US continued encroachments upon the sovereignty, and threats to the security of the DRVN. In 1969, he said, US aircraft carried out 11,810 reconnaissance flights over reconnaissance Hights over North Viet Nam. Against the zone lying between the 17th and 19th parallels, more than 600 bombard-ments by US tactical planes, were recorded together with
40 bombings by US B.52
strategic planes and nearly
300 shellings by US warships
off the coast or by US
artillery based South of the demilitarized zone.

In South Viet Nam, the US has been trying to put US has been trying to put 
'maximum military pressure", carrying out the 
"accelerated pacification" 
program, stepping up bombings and toxic chemical 
sprayings. The US and 
puppets raiding operations 
in 1969 doubled those in 
the previous year. the previous year.

The DRVN envoy dismiss-The DRVN envoy dismiss-ed Nixon's "peace plan" carried out by means of "Vietnamization" of the war as a plan for war pro-longation. He again scored Mr. Nixon's tricky troop reduction by dribblets reduction by dribblet aiming at appeasing public opinion and emphasized that Nixon's "three cri-teria" for US troop with-drawal were impossible to

With regard to litical problems related to South Viet Nam,
Mr. Ha Van Lau commented, the US President

the right to self-determinapeople and agrees to the holding of general elections in South Viet Nam. In fact, he is clinging to the puppet Thieu-Ky-Khiem administra-tion and insisting that the latter be put in charge of organizing elections likely to be rigged, in the hope of legalizing this lackey administration The DRVN representative

refuted Nixon's contention acres" in South Viet Nam after US withdrawal. This, after US withdrawal. Inis, he said, is but a pretext to keep US troops in South Viet Nam and dodge discussions of a sensible political solution to the Viet Nam problem. To mislead world opinion which is condemning the odious crimes committed by US troops in South Viet Nam, the Nixon administration and falsely charged the PLAF with mass slaughters, and on the other hand, launched a campaign on the "prisoners of war" issue. Mr. Ha Van Lau exposed the manoeuvre and scheme prolong the war and elude points of a political solution for South Viet Nam. The Nivon administration must therefore bear reponsibility for delaying the settlement of the problem concerning militarymen captured in the war, a problem which will be solved within the framework of the overall solution

"On the anniversary of the Nixon administration's year in office," he concluded proach to the Viet Nam prob-lem, for abandonment of their illusory, hope for a military victory thro through Viet Nam, forcing neo-colo-nialism on South Viet Nam and perpetuating the parti-tion of Viet Nam. They should give up their manocu-vre of downgrading the con-ference to subsequently sabotage it, and engage serious negotiations to settle the Viet Nam problem on the basis of the 10-point overall solution put forward by the South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South THE NORTH - GREAT REAR BASE OF THE SOUTH

# EXPANSION OF LOCAL INDUSTRY IN NAM HA

NAM HA is a delta prov-ince in North Viet Nam with a population of more than 1.6 million. Its main trade is agricultural production. A few industrial establishments it had were heavily damaged during the war of resistance against the French. Following the return of peace in 1954, some of these installations were restored and expanded, chiefly to meet the immediate needs of the people in the towns and district centres.

In 1965 when the US es-Viet Nam, in implementation of the State policy, Nam Ha started expanding its local industry to serve as the motive force for the building a strong and steady local

Over the past few years, local industry in Nam Ha, relying on the materials found in the province itself and building on a scale compatible with war-time con ditions has been expanding quickly to all areas includ ing the urban centres, the coastal plains the mountain ous areas and areas special-izing in industrial crops or rice growing. Along with

broadening the existing bases, Nam Ha has built new ones. Only in the past four years, in spite of the harsh condi-tions of war, 18 old estab-lishments have been enlargand ar new ones built.

Many traditional handicrafts have also been restored and developed. Today, the whole local industry network in Nam. Ha can already boast of 58 State-run enterprises and 255 small industry or handicraft co-operatives with a contingent of oo.ooo workers and professional or non specialized craftsmen. This is a many-fold increase compared with the past.

There has been a fairly comprehensive development of the Nam Ha local indus-try, which now comprises 11 branches. The main ones are mechanical engineering, building materials, textile industry and food-processing industry. Remarkable has been the vigorous develop-ment of the mechanical engineering whose network now is reaching down from the province level to the districts, villages and agricultural co-ops. It provides on-the-spot service to meet a the specific needs of each farming area while retaining the character as specialized establishments. For instance, there are factories specialized in the production of agricultural machines, and others specialized in the manufacture of farm tools for areas with two rice crops, those with one rice crop (low-lying areas) and those with industrial crops.

Growth rate has been high in both sectors: the State-owned sector and the sector of small industry and ned sector and .... small industry and Gross of small industry and handicraft co-ops. Gross output value has also been rising rapidly. In the four years of the US war of destruction, the output value destruction, the output value of means of production grew 17.8 % and that of consumer goods, 19.9%. The increment was "respectively 45.4% and 11.2% for the State-owned industry and small industry and handicraft co-ops. The tempo of development has tempo of development has been even quicker in some of the principal branches: 65.7% for mechanical engineering, 28.3% for the textile industry. The output value of regional industry in 1968 went up by 19.3% compared with the pre-war period and accounted for

about 30% of the total industrial output value of the technique and management in 1060 increased by 15.66 over 1968. The growth was from The rate 36.8% for mechanical engipaper making, pottery, glassware and food processing. In particular, coal production has soared up eight-fold compared with 1968.

The list of industrial products put out by Nam Ha has been lengthening every year. Many items have achieved ever higher quality like agricultural machines and spare parts to equip the mechanical installations in agricultural co-ops, the water pump of the 500 — 1000 cubic metres per hour capacity, the rice-threshing machine of the 4 tons per hour capacity, the animal food grinder, the steel-hulked motor launch highgrade textile... Prepara tions are under way for th construction of car bodies and small passenger boats.

Local industry in Nam Ha has been focusing efforts on meeting the increasing needs of agricultural produc agriculture has been continually on the upgrade. In 1968, it went up three times compared with the pre-war period.

Every year the province's industrial concerns supply local agriculture with more than 500 agricultural ma-chines of various kinds, and tens of thousands of farm implements of the traditional or improved types. To date, 81% of the agricultural co-ops in the province have been equipped each with a mechanical installation and 56% of them with workshops to repair farm tools. On an average, each farmer in the province had 3.3 hand tools in 1968 (as to this, in many districts. harvesting has been com-pleted a dozen days earlier than formerly. Especially, have saved the farmers ndreds of thousands workdays for such jobs as irrigation, crop tending, ploughing and harrowing for the purpose of intensive cultivation to raise crop vield. As a result, the rice output has upped markedly In 1968, in spite of many difficulties arising out of war aftermaths and weather war aftermaths and weather vagaries, some districts reaped 5 tons or more of paddy per hectare for the whole year. In the current winter-spring 1969 cultivation campaign, the acreage under industrial crops is 50% crops is 5% at of rice 1,000 larger, that of rice 1,000 hectares and the rice output went up by 1.7% over the went up by 1.7% over the previous winter-spring crop). The output of spring rice rose to 2.7 tons per hectare in a single crop. Potato productivity doubled and the number of hogs grew by 7.2% compared with the number of nogs grew by 7.2% compared with the corresponding in 1908. It is safe to say that thanks to the growth of local industry, agricultural production in Nam Ha is developing in a more and more comprehensive manner along the line of high farming. There is every possibility that it will soon reach the three targets set for agriculture throughout North Viet Nam: one man work, five tons of paddy in a year, and two hogs for each hectare of cultivated

A part from giving effect tive assistance to agriculture, the local industry of Nam Ha has also been helpful in the restoration and devel opment of transport communications. Each communications. Each year, it has repaired or built thousands of tons of transport means, ten times as much as in 1064. For heavy much as in 1964, For heavy-freight water transport, it has produced steel-hulked launches and boats, 10-ton wooden boats, etc. It has also supplied thousands of hand-carts to the agricul-tural co-ops and work tools for the hullding of thousands of kilometres of country lanes to improve continually the network of roads leading from the fields to the co-op storehouse, from the villages to districts and from districts to the province capital

There has also been a continual increase of consumer goods wich accounted for about 60% of the retail sales in the organized market of the province in 1968. The same year saw a rise o four million metres of white cloth, five million metres of coloured cloth, twenty bean sauce over 1067. The total output value of consumer goods went up by 1.5 times compared with the pre war

Remarkably enough, there has been a broad partici-pation of the population in the industrial build-up in the province. Take Nam Ninh district for example. Of the 40 villages in the district, 36 villages already have their own industrial installations. The industrial output value in the district in 1968 made up 47% of the combined output of industry and agriculture

At present, Nam Ha's industry is boosting its activity in a more comprehensive manner, in im plementation of the 'on-the-spot logistics' guideline in order to meet in an ever fuller measure the needs of production, the fighting and the life of the local popu-



Repairing and overhauling pumps at Xuan Phung co-operative, Nam Ninh district, Nam Ha province

On Dec. 19, 1969, at a press conjerence called by the International Information Center to Denounce War Crimes and the Franco - Victormete Media cal Association in Paris tames Weeks who once served as a medic with US troops in Viet Nam, gave his testimony on the Viet Nam war and atrocaties. His report :

N March 1967, I arrived in Viet Nam with the impression that I was liber. ating South Viet Nam from communism. I started to have second thoughts soon after landing and getting shot at in Saigon and seeing looks of hate and fear on every side from the people I wasupposed to be liberating. 1 was then assigned to the First Infantry Division attached to the 4th Cavalry. where I spent the next o months as a medic for First Company and Brayo Company. Our base camp was in Phu Lor but most of the time I worked out of Quang Loarrived in Quang Lor in April At that time it was a village of about three to four handred people, small

Just across from the village was a rubber plantation with a small airstrip. We camped on a bill overlooking the plantation manager's home, complete with swimming pool, etc.

Wa stayed in this area working out of Ouang Lor and An Loc. on " search-anddestroy" missions not finding much except an occasional mine, deserted camp sites and an occasional round of sniper fire. But we always had the feeling that the enemy was all around us observing us. The platoon consisted of two or three tanks, five to seven tracked APCs (armored personnel carriers), from four to five men per APC. After a month without any contact with the real enemy, we moved on up to the Black Virgin Mountain, to take part in Operation Junction City. That was in what was known as "free-fire zone" area. It was explained to us at that point that anything alive was supposed to be dead. We were told that if we saw a "gook" or thought we saw one, no matter how big or

small, we shoot first. No

need for permission to fire. It was just an open turkey shoot, man, woman of child

At that time, men, women and children were all part of the "body count". No preference made at all all went into the "body count". This went on for a few weeks At this point I started to realise that a large percentage of guys, from top to bottom, had a great deal of paranoia,

It seemed that everyone was trying to kill you. There were no friendly torces. The people themselves were after us, the farmer in the field, the girl at a stream. They were all classified as "gooks". In fact they were all 'gooks". Whether it was a girl working in the PX, they were all "gooks". All something less than human beings. This is a thing I want to emphasize. The effect this has on a soldier is great because it makes it a lot easier to kill If you can kill a water buffalo or a monkey, you can kill a "gook". You can kill your own sergeant too if he's hassling with you. Another thing important

to realise is when every day.

week after week month af-

ter month, you hear the

bombs, a thousand tons a day dropping, the artillery village there. It had been tiring all night, you know pulverised completely. the bombs are landing in some place and they're not saving "vou're a woman, you're a child". They're just pulverising everything out of sight I started to realise what's the war about when I asked a guy after the first time he'd killed someone over there-how he felt. He said: 'It's about god damn time. I thought those candy assed flyers wouldn't leave anything for me". He was angry that it had taken him a month to get a chance to

we came back at Quang Loi, I noticed a small village across the street from the rubber plantation was being built up into a city, wall to wall, bars where you could buy US cigarettes, beer. food, sex - if you had the right price. At first you wonder how they get the US cigarettes, beer, etc., then you notice there's no more in the PX's which are empty, so you pay twice

let out his hostility.

the price in the village. You know that some PX sergeant is getting rich. This builds your hate even more for the Vietnamese people. So what happens is you walk into a bar sometimes and blow the head off the bar-tender and take your cigarettes and walk out. This is what happened in Phu Loi. Along with occasional night raids into the bars to rape the girls, pressure had been building up like that for two and a half months, when we left there. The day after we left I got word that Charlie Company which had replaced us in the 4th Cay, were overrun the night we left and almost completely wiped out. The word we got, when we got back, from the two who were left as the ARVN troops stationed on their flank fired on them at the same time as the fire from the jungle, also from the village and from inside the airstrip. Nobody knew where it was coming from - except that it was from all over. We began to realise then what was people's war. Everyone was against us as we had felt from the beginning. When we got back Quang Loi had been levelled, first by artillery from An Loc; second by gunships. You would never have known there had been a

Nixon says there was a massacre, an isolated incident at Son My of a few soldiers who went berserk. But I hope that the message the people get from my experiences is that Son My is not an isolated atrocity. The war in Viet Nam is an atrocity. What seems to be an atrocity to some people is everyday life, and standard operating procedure out there.

Other GIs who feel like I do, but who could not come here, have asked me to relate some of their experiences. Some of them have written them down, in signed state-

I have noted some extracts from their full statements. For instance, that of ex-Specialist 4th class Curtis Kirker, ard Brigade of the Fourth Infantry Division, who served as an infantry rifleman and combat correspondent from April 1, 1967 to April 4, 1068. "The My Lai massacre, "he says, "is an extension of such attitudes and policies as I saw developing Quang Ngai province. Although the majority of the killings in Viet Nam don't occur in the same attention - getting fashion as at My Lai, it is just as cold-blooded and cruel, just as disgusting, just as shocking.

"Shortly after I arrived in Viet Nam, a sergeant offered to show me a collection of human ears. The man even offered me a set. Shortly before I left one of the machinegunners in a platoon of Alpha Company removed the finger of an unarmed now dead Vietnam. ese in order to get the ring.

"When I asked him why he was so pleased, he simply said, the 20 dollars he could get from the ring, would buy plenty of beer. The time between was filled with incidents like these and all of them are examples of an attitude that makes massacres possible." Sergeant Kirker goes on

to speak about the sort of

ambushes he used to take part in, in Ouang Ngai province where the My Lai massacre took place: "Villages as well as trails leading to them were often mined. It was during this period the company under Capt. Ellerson had a kill count of around fifty, I think the exact number war 48 of these - a total of three carried weapons. One carried rifle. The other two had knives... Of the 50 approximately 30, some were women, the rest are between the ages of eight and sixteen ... Once in ambush position most knew they would be shooting unarmed civilians. Most felt they were getting back at the Vietnamese and were pleased to see the body count stack up like that. At the beginning of the operation Captain Ellerson made a statement to the company which he repeated throughout the operation; I want those bodies stacked like cord wood'. He meant it literally. The bodies were stacked four one way, four

not the only one carrying

out ambushing tactics and by

the end of the month, the area

enough for another ambush

"While patrolling in the mountains to the west of Duc Pho, the second platoon came across a woman carrying two babies. No attempt was made to stop her by force which would have been easy since she had one child on her back and carried the other in her arms. The point man fired first and then most of the lead squad moved up into firing position and mother were killed, the other child was later sent to the orphanage at Duc Pho. This went on all the time."

I have another statement from Specialist 4th class William Whimeyer, who was a tank crewman, driver and gunner in the 173rd Airborne Brigade: "I witnessed the shooting of 12 civilians. all women or men over 60 years of age. We were sweeping a large rice paddy, near An Hoi village. There was no enemy fire, just people

"When you're in a tank. the people you're shooting at aren't real people, they're dots in your sight - they're just 'gooks'. To the GI mind the 'gooks' are running, they're VC.

"Later the men dismount: ed from the tanks and counted the bodies. They got a lot of laughs out of that ...

There's Roger Williams a former correspondent who covered part of the war for papers like the Denver Post, Cleveland Plain Dealer. Boston Globe and Ramparts. He made a special trip from November 1968 to January 1060, checking up on "pacification" and so on. He also gave me a written statement a few extracts of which I'd like to read:

"I watched an armored company with air support destroy a small village near the Cambodian border. I was in the colonel's command chopper. He ordered it destroved. He watched it burn. I asked nim about it. 'Don't worry,' he said. 'It's only a gook village.' I watched small hamlets the other. My unit was totally disappear in the period... No officer or civilian aid - worker in the vicinity anything about. knew was considered unusable. The After there was nothing smell of bodies in the good

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Reaction Against Nixon's "Vietnamization" in South Viet Nam

## ANTI-WAR UNITED FRONT SHAPING UP IN SOUTH VIET NAM CITIES

1969 saw Nixon step up the implementation of his plan for "Vietnamization" of the war. To this end, the Saigon puppet regime ruthlessly cracked down on the popular mov-ement in all cities and areas still under its control, sped up troop impressment and increased taxes, coupled with demagogic gimmicks. But all this effort only met with strong opposition from people from

"UNPOPULAR" MEASURES

THE war of aggression more and more impoverished the population, particularly the workers and other labouring people. As a result, there existed constant unrest in virtually all enterprises, building sites and other economic establishments with workers pressing for wage lifts, reduction of prices and betterment of living conditions. Labour disturbances in strategically important sectors strategically important sectors affected US-pupper military logistical plans, such as the strike of workers at Saigon's commercial port (January and April 1969) and that of 3,000 employees of Air Viet Nam (December 1969). The persistent action of 3,000 railway workers, that of 30,000 transport workers in the whole of South Viet Nam against the introduction of three-wheeled Lambretta vans as sole passenger transport means, workers against the closing down of the municipal bus service which threw them out into the streets, the last being also of a long-term persistent basis and receiving the support of many branches activity and many localities, o the general strike called by 118 trade unions in Saigon on Jan. 7 and 8, 1970 which paralysed many k y branches of activity in the city.

At the end of October 1969 when the Saigon puppet administration decided to hike taxes on many items of imported goods, a move which ent prices rocketing and made life

harder, popular feeling ran higher in virtually all South Vietnamese cities and inspired vigorous drives for the cancellation of the decision whose impopularity was acknow-ledged by Thieu himself. This large-scale protest drew in many members of the puppet army and administra-tion and even prompted the puppet Senate and House of Representatives to speak out against this economic measure on many occasions

The struggle for the right to live had always been associated with that for democratic rights. The "10-68 anti-strike law enacted by the Saigon puppet administration came under fire from all working quarters. In spite of terror and repression, strikes erupted in many places throughout the year. Apart from the abovementioned walkouts, workstoppago occurred at the Sicovina textile mil the BGI soft drink firm, the Khanh the Bol soit drink lith, lie khalan Hoi sugar mill, Grall Hospital, Qui Nhon, Da Nang and Can Tho ports, etc... Besides the claim for vital rights, the workers put forward slogans against harsh regulations destined to stifle their political life.

The intensity of the movement can be measured by the number of strikes: 8 in Jan. 1969, 30 in June 1969 and 60 in November 1969.

Writers, artists, journalists, small traders, small proprietors and others also militated for freedom of speech and trade and improvement of living

WHEN THE WHITE HOUSE PLANS TO "CHANGE THE COLOUR OF THE CORPSES"

WORKERS and other labouring people in various cities, in democratic rights, did not fail to opse "general mobilisation" and the organisation of "civil defence" and to demand an end to the war, restorations of the war. tion of peace, the change of the régime and the removal of reactionary rulers. These objectives also won the support of various strata of the people, especially the youths

and students. The long, resolute and hard resistance of 30,000 students from 16 Saigon University faculties against military training during the 1060 summer vacation had a reaching impact on many other universities and colleges in South Viet Nam and attracted a large number of students People in almost all cities fought relentlessly against the collection of cannon-fodder for the US aggressors. Young people either dodged or openly resisted the draft. Families did everything they could

to get deferment for their sons and to get deferment for their sons and husbands. Many military conscripts and many persons forced to join "popular defence" teams deserted or disobeyed orders. These objectors acted in clearer and clearer con-sciousness of the tragic consequences of the prolongation of the US war of aggression. In a letter dated Dec. 12 and addressed to American students. the Saigon General Association of Students called for total US troop pull-out, for sovereignty and democ racy to be restored to the country and declared. "We hate the war an we do not want our people to be annihilated and sacrificed for the sake of any inhuman policeman. We do object to anyone wanting to teach us how to kill people". This state-ment threw light on the attitude of the Vietnamese towards the policy "Vietnamization" of the towards what US Ambassador Bunke bluntly termed a "change of the colour of the corpses

THE PATH TO LIFE

HERE was an increasing realisation by the city folk of the origin of their spiritual and material agonies. "Those who style themselves as nationalists and who are feeding on the war are lending a hand to foreigners to prolong killing and the neo-colonialist over the Vietnamese people", stated the Venerable Thien Hoa, head of the Hoa Dao Buddhist Institute in Saigon, at a Buddhist Congress in November-early

circles launched a movement to end the war, restore peace and condemn the prolongation of the slaughter by the US-puppets with a night of praying for peace at An Quang Pagoda. It was followed by a more than 10,000-strong street demonstration on Ian. 25 and a protest sit-in in volving 200 intellectuals, students and political figures. Most recently, on Dec. 15, 1060 at another teach-in at An Quang Pagoda participated in by many representatives of the urban people, a committee of action for peace was set up to mobilize the people for the vital drive for peace and independence.

A remarkable occurrence, had been unfolding since May 1969 when the townsfolk and many members of the puppet administration and officers and men of the puppet army began heated discussions of the ro-point overall solution advanced by the NFL. the formation of the RSVN Provisional Revolutionary Government and its 12-point programme of action. Thousands of teach-ins were held in many cities to debate a correct solution to the Viet Nam prob lem. The audience condemned the Thieu-Ky-Khiem triumvirate for obstructing the peace move and demanded their replacement by a government representative of the aspirations of various segments of the people and capable of winning back peace and the country's sovereignty Such will had an impact on polit Assembly Many congressmen raised their voices for partial or total dissolution of the US installed Cabinet, an end to arbitrary economic measures, etc..

The paying of last tributes to President Ho Chi Minh in diversified forms in various South Viet Nam cities also had a great political significance and impact.

A united front against the US war has been in the making in South Viet Nam cities and striking hard at the Nixon administration's

# "CLEAR-AND-HOLD": AN IMPOTENT STRATEGY

Condensed from a Commentary by Quan Doi Nhan Dan (People's Army)

THE "clear-and-hold" strategy which Creighton Abrams has been carrying out in South Viet Nam since the outbreak of the general offensive and widespread uprising of the Liberation Armed Forces in early 1968 is sharing the fate of the US two-prong strategy ("search-and-destroy" and "pacifi-

Its basic objective is to "hold". "clear" is also aimed at "holding", namely:

- to hold the US losses at a evel acceptable to the US and enables it to prolong the war, find a solution from a "position of strength" and cope with the protest movement in the United States.

- to hold the puppet army and administration from the danger of complete disintegration:

- to hold the nerve positions, namely the towns, military bases, main communication arteries and

To attain these objectives, US has decided on the following

- to build an efficacions defence system around the towns and impor-tant bases, strengthen the defence of military sectors and sub-sectors and set up strongholds along stra-tegic roads;

- to establish defence shields for pushing the war away from the towns of military and political im-

- to launch police operations in various towns, clearing operations around towns and bases and along communication axes, counter-operaPLAF, increase reconnaissance and commando activities to locate the

latter for air and artillery strikes; - to carry out the "pacification" plan so as to regain the control of populated rural areas.

Has the US Succeeded in Pushing the War away from the Towns?

The Figaro said on February 25, 1969, "All military and police operations, all artillery barrages and B.52 raids infiltrations."

As a matter of fact, in the to days ending March 4, 1969, more than 400 US and puppet positions in 36 towns and urban centres and many other military bases were targets of PLAF infantry and artillery attacks. so were 485 positions in at least 94 towns and urban centres in mid-May. Many other actions were mounte

from August to the end of last year on various towns, urban centres and military sub-sectors throughout South Viet Nam.

Have US Losses Been Reduced?

Reuter on February 26, 1969 reported, "American daily losses in the first four days of the new Viet Cong offensive are heavier than those for the first four days of the nation-wide Tet offensive last year.

According to a recent communique of the Command of the South Vie Nam People's Liberation Armed Forces the latter in 1969 put out of action 235,000 US and satellite troops, as as previous year. as against 230,000 in the

Have the US Succeeded in Pre venting PLAF Attacks?

Abrams himself dared not answer

(Continued page 7)

# LAOTIAN PATRIOTIC FRONT'S Hanoi Information Bureau Inaugurated

implementation of an agreement between the Viet Nam Fatherland Front and the Laotian Patriotic Front, the Information Bureau of the Lactian Patriotic Front in Hanoi beside the Viet Nam Fatherland Front was officially inaugurated on Janua-TV 10, 1970.

In his speech delivered on this occasion, Phau Phim-pliachanh, member of the Central Committee of the LPF and Director of the Information Bureau, pointed out that the setting up of the LPF Information Bureau in Hanoi was a new manifestation of the increasing mili tant solidarity between the Laotian and Vietnamese peoples and a great encour-agement to the Laotian people in the struggle against the US imperialists and their benchmen He told the guest of the great successes recorded by the Laotian peode over the past 25 years ership of the LPF headed by Prince Souphanouvong.

He expressed deep grati-tude to the peoples of the socialist and nationalist countries and the progressive people the world over for their warm and active support to the Laotian people's ust struggle

After condemning the US mperialists and their accomplices—the Vientiane reactionary ruling circles and Prince Souvanna Phou-ma, for committing countless crimes in Laos and scheming to turn Laos into a new-type colony and military base, Phau Phimphachanh rejected the slanders levelled the Laotian reactionaries the DRVN.

He said: "Peace will be restored in Laos if the US imperialists put an end to sion in every form, imple ment the 1962 Geneva Agreement on Laos, respect the sovereignty independence neutrality and territorial integrity of Laos and let the Laotians settle their internal affairs under the terms of the 1962-Geneva Agreement and with due consideration for the real situation in Laos, without US interference. First and foremost, the US must halt its bombardments against the Laotian liberated zones."

Speaking next, Tran Huu Duvet Secretary-General of the Viet Nam Fatherland Front Central Committee, paid tribute to the achievenents of the Laotian revo

Despite heavy losses, he said, the US aggressors remain very stubborn and perfidious. They continue encroaching upon the sover-

eignty and security of the DRVN, stepping up their war of aggression in South Viet Nam, provoking, and con ducting sabotage against, Cambodia, intensifying and stepping up their special war

in Laos to a dangerous level and maintaining a tense situation in Indochina and Southeast Asia. Facing the US imperialists manoeuvres, he continued, the Indochinese peoples are determined to strengthen their solidarity, resist and defeat US aggression and preserve their sacred national

The Vietnamese

firmly support the legitimate ple, the correct position of the Laotian Patriotic Front which strives for a settle ment of the Laotian problem on the basis of th 1962 Geneva Agreement on Laos and in conformity with the present concrete situation in Laos. The establish ment of the Laotian Patriot ic Front's Information Bu-reau in Hanoi demonstrates the upward trend of the Laotian revolution and is a fine expression of the friend ship and mutual encourage-ment between the two Fronts and peoples. We are convinced that the militant solidarity between Viet Nam and Laos will develop ever

### News from

### THE LAO SUNG ARE RESOLVED TO PUNISH THE ENEMY

A T a recent reception given by Phay Dang, Vice President of the CC of the Laotian Patriotic Front, and well-known chief of the Lao Sung, on December 15, 1059 on the occasion of the New Year of that nationality, Prince Souphanouvong called on all the patriotic armed forces and Laotian people, especially the Lao Sung, to step up their attacks against enemy encroaching operations of the patriotic armed forces and Laotian people, especially the Lao Sung.

On behalf of the CC of the LPF, Prince Souphanouvong congratulated the Lao Sung people on their contribution to the patriotic struggle against US aggression and called on them to punish the enemy for the crimes he had per-

on them to punish the enemy for the crimes he had per-petrated in the raids now going on in the Plain of Jars-Xieng Khouang area.

In the name of the Lao Sung people, Phay Dang indignantly denounced the US imperialists and their lackeys' "divide and rule" policy and presaganging of Lao Sung youth in the "special forces" as cannon fooder in the US war of aggression.

### LAOTIAN PATRIOTS' EXPLOITS IN DECEMBER 1969

N December 1969, the second month of the dry-season counter-offensive of the Laotate patrictic armed force, the enemy lost 2,400 troops, 44 military vehicles and handreds of tons of other war means, announced KPL Agency quoting incomplete reports.

This was biggest monthly loss in lives and war means

This was biggest monthly loss in lives and war means for the US reactionaries in Laos last year. In the Plain of Jars — Xieng Khuang region, the main battlefield, the patriots put out of action 1,319 enemy troops. They seized or destroyed 6 artillery pieces, wrecked 35 military vehicles, mostly tanks and armoured cars, and 29 tents, and burned tens of thousands of litres of petrol.

In Lower Laos, the patriots pushed up their attacks on Roads 9 and 13, while encircling enemy garrisons in Pakhong, Attopeu, Saravane. As a result, 620 adverse soldiers were knocked out, 45 weapons seized, and 3 military vehicles captured or destroyed by the patriots.

Stepping up the hunt for US-fostered bandits smuggled in the free zone in Upper Laos for sabotage activity, the

in the free zone in Upper Laos for sabotage activity, the patriotic armed forces duly punished the enemy in Tongkho area, Luang Prabang province, and forced over 100 bandits

Meanwhile, guerillas stepped up their actions everywhere Meanwhile, guerillas stepped up their actions everywhere behind enemy lines. In Vientiane, from December 1 to 20, they ambushed the enemy 6 times on the Vientiane — Nam Ngeum road, destroying 6 military vehicles and wiping out ageum road, destroying 6 minitary venicies and wiping our many enemy troops. The regional armed forces in Borikhausay overran on December 11 an enemy position in Don village, killing 32 enemy, capturing or forced 5 others

Chopper of US Airborne Division No 101 downed by guerrillas of Thua Thien province

## "CLEAR-AND-HOLD"...

(Continued from page 5)

in the affirmative. Despite the strict application of his tactics of maximum use of fire-power, the PLAF last year increased considerably their offensives. The greater US-puppet losses in man-power and materials, espec-ially in aircraft, vehicles, cannons and vessels, proved that they grew proportion-ally to the fire-power employed. At times the ineff cient use of its fire-power pushed the US to conduct "clearing" operations, but the farther the GIs venture from their bases, the heavier their casualties, as proved by the A Bia battle

Have the Populated Rural Areas Been "Pacified"

Of late, while the US claimed to control 90 per cent of the population, a high-ranking American officer told an American journalist then inquiring into "pacifi-cation" progress in Quang Nam that 90 per cent of the local inhabitants would kill GIs at the least opportu-nity. The US and puppets have themselves acknowledged that "pacification" re-mains a hard job, that the "insecure" hamlets and villages are quite numerous and that tens of thousands of "pacification" agents

Have the US Succeeded in Bolstering the Puppet Army's Morale ?

According to *UPI* on September 28, 1969, the Saigon puppets' chieftain Nguyen Van Thieu said that "he did not believe the Vietnamese army (puppet-Ed.) could defend the country properly if the US withdrew completely by 1970, leaving behind air force units, artil-lery and logistic support". Thieu did not tell the whole truth because the fact is that even now, with the presence of more than 9 US infantry divisions in South Viet Nam, neither American nor puppet troops are able to cope with the PLAF attacks. As for the puppet army, it has taken serious thrashings in Chu Pa (Gia Lai), Ben Het, Bu Prang

(Quang Duc), Ba Ria, Long Khanh on the Xang Keo Ro canal in the Mekong Delta, etc. And what is remarkable their losses have been greater at the very places chosen as the key points of the "pacification" plan such as the High Plateaux, Western Nam Bo, Ben Tre and Rach Gia provinces. On the other hand, as reported by AP on December 17. by AP on December 17, desertions from the South Viet Nam (puppet-Ed.) armed forces increased this fall despite efforts to solve what officials say is the second most serious problem in Vietnamizing the war... With more than one million men Nam forces, the rate of desertions per one thousand men adds up to a loss of 10,000 men a month."

"clear-and - hold " trategy is going bankrupt.

Nixon and company are
trying by hook or by crook
to turn the tables, but how can this be possible when they are pinning their hopes on a strategy full of unsolva ble contradictions?

"Our military can cease

all offensive actions, all

search-and-destroy missions,

all air and sea attacks, and

"The South Vietnamese armed forces (puppet army-Ed.) will never successfully take over the military bur den now carried by the United States.

"It is not hardware or training that is lacking in Saigon's armies. It is will, the one ingredient the United States will never be able to provide. Thieu's soldiers have no heart for this struggle and have not had any for years. Indeed, one of the most striking phenomena of the war is the contrast between the contending forces: a Vietnamese dressed in the peasant garb of the NLF is one of the world's most formidable fighting men; the same man in the uniform of Saigon is one of the world's poorest. Why? Because one believes he fights to drive the foreigner from his soil while the other fights only to sustain the power of

a corrupt military clique Under these - circumstances any hope of simultaneously defeating the NLF and withdrawing US troops has no chance of success

"If, therefore, a continuing US military presence in Viet Nam will not result in any genuine pacification of a war-weary and embittered countryside and will not make palatable a government that is not palatable, nor an army fight that has no will to fight, it becomes useless to pursue further a course that is leading no where. It is useless to stay on even for the purpose of a bargaining position in Paris, because there is no reason to think that time will serve to strengthen the US position The only viable option left for the US in Viet Nam is to withdraw at once from the whole tragically misconceived adventure

withdraw US troops to port areas for repatriation. This action would have the paramount advantage of returning the future of Viet Nam to the Vietnamese, where it belongs. Questions of reunification and political settlement are questions for the Vietnamese to answer, because the Vietnamese, whether they live in Hanoi or in Saigon, are still a single people. As the only foreigners in South Viet Nam, the US and its allies have nothing to negotiate but the rate and manner of their withdrawal.

The statement concluded: "Let us therefore order a cease-fire and withdrawal from Viet Nam, unilaterally and immediately. If it was wrong to get in, it cannot be

## Military **Operations**

(Continued from page 8)

on Jan. 4 and 5 130 casual- action. ties on the enemy, grounded 6 choppers and captured 20 members of a "pacification"

On the same day, in Saigon, they blew up a US military car, killing all pas-

On the Western bank of the Mekong, about 50 km Southwest of Saigon, regional troops of My The province from January 3 to 5 rushed a battalion camp, pounded 5 subsector CPs and intercepted the enemy operating in the region : 200 adverse soldiers o vehicles and 2 cannons put out of

Further West between the arms of the Mekong and the Gulf of Thailand, the PLAF were most active in Char Doe province, chiefly in the Seven-Mountains area They also flattened Rong Co post (Jan.4) and Ba Doi post (lan 5) sank or burnt vessels on the Vinh Te canal dug along the Cambodian border Furthermore, 4FP reported on Iau. 15 that the special forces" camp at Ba Xoai had been completely blotted out by a daytim attack on Jan. 14 and that two American advisors were among the 18 men killed during that PLAF action.

# Son My...

(Continued from page 4)

left but shattered houses and blown-up gardens, the hamlet was 'pacified'. If peohamlet was 'pacified'. If p such hamlets on a day of incoming fire—they die.
If they are found alive in private bunkers, they are killed by US troops who are told that anyone in a bunker is Viet Cong...

"One colonel I overheard when he was presented with his brigade's body count for the day — 59 enemy killed— and told that the 3rd brigade only got 40, said: 'I don't -all I care is that I'm killing gooks'. This is not GI policy, it is the policy of

In one of Williams' inter views with a senior US aid official, he was told that 3,000 bodies had been killed US air strikes in the Cho Lon area after the Tet offensive. When he what happened to them he was told that aid had order ed that they should be bullunder the rubble When the GIs found several thousand bodies buried in the race track near Saigon was announced by our embassy as a "Viet Cong massacre", Roger Williams discovered. "But it was found from prisoner interrogation that these too were victims of American bombing during the reconquest of Saigon and that the NFL torces had buried them by in carefully - dug graves

Roger Williams touches on a point that all of us out there feel and which I myself have mentioned:

"Our planes, our artillery. our gunships get five hundred a day, so what if my when we've taken fire from What most amazed me is that we would completely destroy the country in order to save' it, if we deemed it necessary W. have already done half the job. Our policy and our giant machine bases its existence on a systematic program o destruction with artillery bomber naval guns, gunships, rockets, mortars, tanks and fifty-calibre machineguns mounted on armored vehicles... We are trying to destroy the Vietnamese revolution, and with it Viet Nam. In a way we are succeeding.

platoon shoots on a village

" One major told me he ersonally counted 2.000 bodies after a particularly exhausting engagement. They were bulldozed into heaps and shovelled into sling-nets and taken away by Chinook choppers. 'When you see a sight like that', he said smiling, 'you know we're winning.

The main point that I ould like to make is that and all my friends who have been out there object to the idea that Son My was an isolated case. It is standard operating procedure.

> TO THE READER We are aware that there

s much room for imbrove nent in the wording of our paper. We apologize for this shortcoming and highly appreciate all your suggestions as they will helb us to serve you more efficiently in future.

# ANTI-WAR AMERICANS ISSUE STATEMENT

IE American Friends Service Committee has issued a statement baring the Nixon administra-tion's tricks to further their scheme of war continuation in Viet Nam.

The statement, entitled "Viet Nam - Political Illu-sions and Moral Realities"

"It has been more than a year since the rhetoric of peace began in Viet Nam. During this time scores of thousands of men and wom-en and children have died in the fighting. They continue to die today, and every evidence in Viet Nam is that they will continue to die tomorrow unless there is an unparalleled demand from the American people that the slaughter be halted. While attempting to disarm public opinion with troop withdrawals, the Nixou administration continues to press the war. "The US military and

government leaders continue to foster illusions in regard to Viet Nam. Americans are under the impression that the war is all but over; it not. They are being told that the US military policy is one of restraint in interest of progress in Paris; it is not. They are encouraged to think that the Thieu-Ky government is becoming more acceptable to the Viet namese and more competent to carry on the war with diminishing US-help; it is

The statement went on: "If the cruelty of a war is measured by the ratio of civilian to military casual

ties, the war in Viet Nam may be the cruelest of modern times. Even before the Tet offensive of 1968, it was estimated that there were from 150,000 to 200,000 civilian casualties annually...

Hundreds of thousands of acres have been defoliated, countless villages have been razed and bomb craters pockmark the countryside.

B-52 raids alone have
torn 2 million and a
half of holes 45 feet in
diameter and 30 feet deep—
holes that are now filled with stagnant water and serve as breeding grounds for malarial mosquitoes and other insects. More tons of explosives have been dropped were dropped on all the Axis powers in all of the Second World War...

US goals in Viet Nam are limited ones. Earlier talk of victory has ceased as the death toll has risen and as the decimation of Viet Nam has become apparent. Today the apologists for continued military action arguthat our commitment will be fulfilled if our forces can achieve a reasonably pacific countryside, a reasonably stable government, and a reasonably effective Vietnamese army, capable of de-fending itself against its opponents. The American people are assured that progress toward these goals is being made.

In fact, pacification efforts have repeatedly fail-ed over a ten-year period, and they will continue to fail. The countryside is less

in 1965, and anti-American feeling has never been so intense as it is now. The Thieu-Ky government does not offer any promise of future stability. The government in Saigon is a military dictatorship propped up by US power, despised by most Vietnamese, and notoriously corrupt. Freedom of speech is suppressed. No one knows exactly how many Vietnamese political prisoners lan-guish in Viet Nam's prison out the figure is certainly in the thousands, and includes many of the country's lead ing intellectuals: university professors, religious leaders, lawyers, students, newspaper editors, politicians — anyone who has dared to advocate olitical initiatives to end

VIET NAM COURIER

VIET NAM COURIER

Cam Toi Victory

## THE FIRST STAGGERING BLOW OF THE YEAR AT THE US **AGGRESSORS**

N their defence system in the Da Nang Chu Lai sector, the Americans have set up an important base on the formerly woody hill-top of Cam Zoi, about forty kilometres south of Da Nang, near Que Son, Called "Base Ross" by the US command, it always served as regimental field CP whenever an important operation took place in that area and was therefore constantly improved and strengthened chiefly since the enemy had been driven into a general defensive position all over South Viet Nam. The great uccess quickly won by the PLAF on the night of Jan. 5 at Cam Zoi bears a great significance at the beginning of the new year.

First the heavy losses suffered by the enemy cloquently testify to the deadly punch of the PLAF, who in a record time killed or wounded nearly 400 GIs, wiped out a battalion CP, 2 infantry companies and an artillery platoon and destroyed a radar station, the signal centre, o military vehicles, 2 long-range cannons, about one hundred barracks, caseand blockhouses, mates burnt, blew up or seized a big quantity of war materials, ammunition and fuel.

Furthermore, the factor surprise had nothing to do here though the GIs were well taken unawares in their sleep, for it was not the first time that that base was overrun by the PLAF. In the winter of 1967, the first GIs (paratroops of the US 101st Division) already suffered a great disaster at Cam Zoi. On Feb. 22 and 27. 1969, the 196th Light Brigade which relieved the American " para " was clobbered on that hill-top. In the autumn of that year, that brigade was so heavily depleted by PLAF bombardments that it had to be replaced by the First Marine Division, which in its turn licked the dust in a fierce hand-to-hand fight on the night of Jan. 6, 1970.

Besides, the Yankees were well prepared to parry our blows, as shown by the war materials captured at Cam Zoi, which included many electronic apparatuses apparently meant to dectect attackers at night.

The successful coup also illustrates the patriotic forces' capability of dealing with all defences and techniques devised by the aggressors, and rapid progress in combativeness and efficiency, which is rather an ill omen for the US war and "Vietnamization" of the war!

# MILITARY OPERATIONS

G last week highlighted the following military

DA NANG - CHU LAI AREA

ROM Jan. 4 to 6, PLAF men attacked about one hundred enemy bases and positions in the coastal provinces of Quang Nam, Quang Tin, Quang Naj, and Biah Dish, between the 14th and 16th parallels Nace Nam (near Da Nang) helicopter park, a dozen sub-sector CPs, and many points d'app points d'app quand many points d'app quand parany parang p park, a dozen sub-sector CPs, and many points d'appui around Da Nang and Che Lisi, were hit by the patriotic forces. Let's mention the devastating raid on Cam Zei position, near Que'Sen, about 40 km south of Da Nang and west-northwest of Chu Lai. PLAF commandos succeeded in storming this Ross Base (American name) and depuis oing the GIs garrisoned there n a hand-to-hand fight desin a hand-to-hand fight despite the numerical inferiory of the PLAF units: 400 US marines of Regiment 7, US Division 1, put out of action. The lattation CP, two infantry companies, an artillery section, the whole radar station and signal centre, were wiped out, 9 military vehicles (5 tanks) 2175 mm cannons, to recoil less guns and heavy To recoilless guns and heavy machine-guns, about one hunmachine-guns, about one hun-dred barracks, blockhouses and casemates destroyed, many fuel tanks andammu-

nittion dumps and an impor-tant booty including elec-tronic dectection and infrared apparatuses seized.

North of Quang Ngai, near Sen My, scene of the March 1968 massacre of over 500 civilians by the GIs, another key-post was overrun or 600 civilians by the GIs, another services of a battalion CP and an artillery company disabled, 8 heavy guns, many military vehicles and a great quantity of ammunition at Nuoc Man destroyed.

WESTERN HIGH PLA-TEAUX, SAIGON REGION MEKONG DELTA

ORTH of the Western High Plateaux, from Jan. 5 to 8, the PLAF put out of action at least 200 adverse troops and about 50 vehicles. The major engagement was the ambush laid along Not to between laid along No.19 between Pleiku and Mang Yang pass on Jan.5: 5 tanks and 23 tank lorries destroyed and 68 GIs killed or wounded.

Southwest of the Plateaux, in many onsets mounted on Jan. 6 in Phu Thien district, the PLAF wrote off the musterroll or decimated a puppet company and three platoons. In Tay Ninh province (about one hundred kilometres northwest of Saigon), the PLAF inflicted

(Continued page 7)

### MORE ON SAIGON WORKER'S GENERAL STRIKE

RIGHT on the morning of January 7, two important communicaimportant communica-tion centres, namely the Tan Son Shat Airport and the Saigon Port, were virtually paralysed. At the commer-cial harbour, all loading and unloading operations came to a standstill. At the came to a standstill. At the military harbour, six military to,ooo-ton cargo ships filled with war materials were tied down. At Pier 6, 18 other military ships faced the same situation. So did the same situation. So die ships at several other piers

Workers at Shell, Caltex and Esso refused to refuel air planes, causing the cancellation of nearly all flights from Tan Son Nhat Air port.

The general strike enlisted The general strike enlisted the support of large seg-ments of the Saigonese. A statement of support was issued by the Saigon General Association of Students.

### NGUYEN VAN THIEU'S NEW YEAR MESSAGE

ON Jan. 8, 1070, puppet
President Nguyen Van
Thieu delivered a
New Year speech. On Jan.
9, he called a press conference to make public his
administration's 1970 prog-

Western agencies reported Saigon opinion

nothing new in his speech compared with the one he had delivered at the end of 1969. What was new was only its "harsher" tone as a result of US Vice-President new's visit to Saigon ster up the tottering Saigon

namese youths who would die in place of American troops, in implementation of the White House's Vietnamization

Nguyen Van Thieu implored Nixon not to withdraw all the GIs in 1970: "This (total withdrawal)", he

of US combat troops will remain in South Viet Nam to help us defend the US logistic bases and support forces which are to stay behind."

In the same address, Nguyen Van Thieu endea-youred to white-wash the

### HIRED HOOLIGANS

HE Saigon Senate recent-THE Saigon Senate recently put to discussion a
fo-page report on the
Thieu-organized sacking of
the Lower House on Dec.
20, 1969, Western agencies
reported. It is well-known
that this act of hooliganism
was an incident which was an incident which spelled out the dissensions between various factions among US stooges in Saigon. The report said that each of Saigon's wards was ordered by Thieu to contribute 10 members of the popular defence" to that violent raid "popular defence" to that violent raid against the Lower House. Each ward received 200 piasters to cover transport expenses whereas each "demonstrawhereas each demonstra-tor was paid too plasters. The sackers were black uniforms and were armed with carbins and pistols. They were led by Pho Thai Gia, Chairman of the Saigon City Council.

A Giai Phong Press Agency prespondent in Saigon orrespondent in Saigon reported that a number of City Councillors revealed that that body had received from Thieu's wife a cheque from Thieu's wife a cheque of 3 million piasters as reward for the "demonstrators". A force of 200 thugs was conducted by the Secretary-General of the "Great Union Forces", a political party created by Thieu, and took part in the storming of the Lower Haves or that due storming of the House on that day.

## SITUATION IN SAIGON

Nguyen Van Thieu once again reiterated his "de-escalation from a position of strength" argument, rejected all forms of coalition government and opposed a neutralist regime for South Viet Nam. In short, he showed readiness to continue helping his masters pursue their aggressive war against his own people.

He said, "We have first to beef up, consolidate and modernize our regular forces... and expand and strengthen our security forces..." In other words, he forces..." In other words, as would step up the compul-sory draft of South Vietsaid "cannot be feasible. It would be unrealistic, since we have only a limited troop strength. We need time for the training of our men. We need American equipment. We need time to train commanders for our newly formed units". His words betrayed the panic caused by US plans to his US-backed

Interestingly enough, some features of Nixon's tricky plan for troop withdrawals by dribblets were precisely revealed by Nguyen Van Thieu's speech. "In 1970," he said, "a number

US massacre of more than 500 civilians at Son My, which had been universally condemned. He said, "There may be some US individuals who killed some Viet-namese".

Nguyen Van Thieu only revealed himself as a true stooge of the US imperial-ists, an instrument for the implementation of Nixon's plan to "Vietnamize" the war. The Saigon adminisration's 1970 programme was indeed another sell-out. tration's

SAIGON LOWER HOUSE SACKED BY THIEU-